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Abstract: 
In this work we address the main issues of Information Technology (IT) consumerisation that are related to security risks, and 
vulnerabilities of devices used within Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) strategy in particular. We propose a ‘soft’ mitigation strategy 
for user actions based on nudging, widely applied to health and social behaviour influence. In particular, we propose a 
complementary, less strict, more flexible Information Security policies, based on risk assessment of device vulnerabilities and threats 
to corporate data and devices, combined with a strategy of influencing security behaviour by nudging. We argue that nudging, by 
taking into account the context of the decision-making environment, and the fact that the employee may be in better position to make 
a more appropriate decision, may be more suitable than strict policies in situations of uncertainty of security-related decisions. 
Several examples of nudging are considered for different tested and potential scenarios in security context. 
Keywords: 
consumerisation; security; risks; mitigation strategies; nudging 
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1. Introduction to the consumerisation of IT 
Globalization and the worldwide availability of the Internet (for both stationary and mobile devices) has led to the 
elimination of the spatial divide within traditional working environments, and thereby enabling the working 
environment to be highly mobile. Increasingly, people work not from a single office, but from multiple offices, on 
customer sites, when traveling, at home and in public places. At the same time, the technology markets fuel and adapt to 
such dynamic environments by regularly supplying a variety of new mobile devices to meet different business 
requirements and purposes.  
The rapid development of Information Technology (IT) products and their constantly reducing costs make the best 
’high-tech’ technologies available not only to large companies, but also to the general public for personal usage. Data 
interchange between devices is also increasing. Storing data on individual devices not only becomes impractical, but 
also insufficient for its distributed usage. Cloud-based solutions are therefore of high demand for both private and work-
related usage by employees.  
This orientation of products and services towards users is known as consumerisation of IT. Here, a user (an employee of 
a company) is also a consumer of devices and services, both owned by the company (the user’s employer) and privately 
purchased by the user. The use of such products and services via the Internet for personal activities (e.g. social networks 
and other web tools) pushes companies to adapt business technologies used by employees for personal purposes. At the 
same time, companies expect an employee to be productive and responsive at anytime from anywhere, thus integrating 
employees’ personal life with their work. In turn, companies that keep pace with new technologies and take full 
advantage of them have more chances to improve their business and both short- and long-term returns [1]. 
Under the conditions of a fast growing economy and improved technologies, such “mobilization” of businesses will 
continue, involving further companies and employees. To stay competitive in such a dynamic market, companies need 
to quickly adapt to these trends and provide their employees with ways of working in such mobile environments, for 
instance by providing them with up-to-date mobile phones, laptops and/or tablets. However, frequently updating the 
equipment of employees is costly for companies and the pace of upgrades may not keep up with their expectations. 
In such circumstances, a recent trend is for companies, large firms and small to medium enterprises (SMEs) alike, to 
allow their employees to work with their own devices. This strategy, known as bring your own device (BYOD), 
introduces flexibility for employees and affords the opportunity for the companies to satisfy the wishes of their 
employees to work with devices they own without increasing equipment budgets.  
Many practitioners consider further IT consumerisation inevitable. Trend Micro Inc. performed a survey confirming 
that 74% of IT enterprises were allowing BYOD for their employees. However, they emphasized that consumerisation 
of IT carries strategic and operational challenges and ‘creates security risk, financial exposure and a management 
nightmare for IT’ without a planned approach to it [2]. 
Together with opportunities, consumerisation of IT introduces some severe security risks. These risks include: weak 
control over employees private devices (e.g., old or absent anti-virus software); possible weakness of protection 
measures of services used to transfer or store company data; potentially unsecured environments, in which employees 
may use their mobile devices (e.g., public places or foreign countries). 
In addition to preoccupations related to technical security aspects, human factors are of high importance in the context 
of global consumerisation. On the one hand, when using personal devices for work (or company devices for personal 
purposes), the border between personal and company data becomes blurred. On the other hand, attempts from 
companies to take control over personal devices for their better protection may meet opposition from employees, and 
disturb their ownership perception associated with their devices and privacy intrusion sentiments. Therefore, companies 
must consider these facts when developing their security policies. 
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In this work we consider how changes in the employees working context (from the office to public places or home) and 
in the ownership of the devices (from corporate to personal) introduce uncertainty in security decisions. We suggest a 
‘soft’ strategy to assist in security decision-making under uncertainty, based on nudging. This approach was defined for 
health and social solutions [3], [4] and recently studied in the context of security and privacy decision-making [5]-[12]. 
In particular, we indicate when nudging may be beneficial to both the company and employee and, consequently, lead 
to a more secure and productive society in general. 
In Section 2, we discuss practical approaches to risk assessment and mitigation of consumerisation risks existing in the 
literature. In Section 3 we analyse in more detail the uncertainty that consumerisation of IT brings to security decisions. 
In Section 4 we discuss risks that the BYOD strategy introduces and different levels of controls for managing those 
risks. We provide an approach to influence the behaviour of users towards more secure or more productive choices 
based on nudging techniques widely applied in marketing in Section 5. Finally, we conclude this work and outline the 
direction of future research in Section 6. 
2. Approaches to consumerisation risk management 
Different organizations may have different risk assessment strategies and may include in their security policy only risks 
specific to their activity. The European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), which develops security 
recommendations for EU countries, delivered a report that may serve as a good guideline for SMEs to perform a risk 
assessment [13]. According to this report, a company should identify its risk profile depending on the: size of the 
company; yearly revenue; data type a company is dealing with (e.g. critical personal data, such as medical information, 
customer data or just employees data); and loss of reputation and customers confidence depending on unavailability of 
service. The critical assets should be identified among systems (server, laptops, workstations storage, archiving and 
backups), network (routers, cabling, gateways wireless access points, network segments, etc.), people (HR, R&D, Sales 
and Marketing, Contractors and Third Party, Operations and Technology) and applications (ERP, Logistics, e-
commerce, financial control, logistics) categories. In particular, for each asset the security requirements related to the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability aspects should be identified.  
Depending on the company risk profile and critical assets, ENISA suggests selecting a number of organizational and 
asset-based controls that will become a part of a security requirements list, implemented within either physical security, 
system and network management, system administration tools, monitoring and auditing IT security, authentication and 
authorization, vulnerability management, encryption, security architecture, incident management or general staff 
practices [13]. The identified key security areas of the company help to shape its security efforts, in particular (i) 
defining and selecting requirements to be implemented within company’s security policy; (ii) specifying key technical 
and management controls for preventing disasters and incidents; (iii) developing recovery plans and educational 
programs needed for staff training. 
In addition to standard risk assessments, e.g. based on ENISA proposed scheme [13] or ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [14], 
when assessing the BYOD strategy of a company, opportunities should be considered. ENISA analysed IT 
consumerisation considering related costs and opportunities [15], and suggested various mitigation strategies to reduce 
the risks in the areas of governance, legal and regulatory issues and technical issues [16], which are related to potential 
losses and gains that a company may have with respect to confidentiality, integrity or availability of its assets when 
introducing IT consumerisation. These mitigation strategies correlate with concerns related to consumerisation reported 
by several Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs) of large enterprises interviewed by Microsoft [17], such as 
governance related to monitoring of personal devices, e-discovery associated with legal issues of business data stored 
on personal devices, and general security and control of data for privately owned devices. 
MWR Security published a detailed report on mobile devices security, including BYOD strategies for companies, in 
cooperation with the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) [18]. According to this report, 
companies developing a security policy including mobile devices and BYOD strategy should consider the following 
challenges: (i) fast developing IT technologies in general and the constantly emerging variety of mobile devices in 
IJISPM 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management 
5 
particular; (ii) different risk profiles within variety of vendors of the same type of device (for instance, iPhone-based 
and Android-based mobile phones risk profiles are different, moreover, risks vary between devices using different 
versions of the same Operating System (OS)); (iii) assets that a company possesses and tries to protect; (iv) possible 
assets vulnerabilities (which are assets weaknesses that can be used for security breaches); (v) threats (against what the 
protection efforts are directed) and risks specific to the activities of the company and its employees; (vi) variety of 
working locations, both public (cafes, parks, hospitals, organizations) and private (home, other companies); (vii) 
organizational structure, whether it is an SME (with mainly 3rd party vendors/suppliers taking care of security) or a 
large company (with a CISO dedicated to maintaining company security). 
In addition to technical challenges, attention should be paid to users’ awareness of risks, their education and advising or 
providing recommendation to users whenever possible [18]. Employers may consider different educational tools for 
teaching their employees the security issues related to their company’s policy, and promote a security culture, e.g., with 
rewards for secure behaviour. However, these long-terms approaches require time and involve user awareness and 
conscious decision-making. While users may be aware and intend to behave securely, these intentions do not always 
translate into actual behaviour. Therefore a complementary alternative approach would be to try to influence the 
behaviour of the decision makers directly at the moment of the decision-making. 
Influencing users behaviour instead of forcing it looks very attractive for security decisions in situations of uncertainty 
that may be related to dynamic contexts, in which users may ‘know better’, and/or when dealing with mobile devices, 
which employees use, but which are not fully controlled by the company-employer. In the next section we will explore 
an influencing approach for security. 
3. BYOD Vulnerabilities 
A vulnerability can be seen as ‘the intersection of three elements: a system susceptibility or flaw, attacker access to the 
flaw, and attacker capability to exploit the flaw’ [30]. For the purpose of this paper we shall reflect explicitly on the first 
two assuming a ‘worst case scenario’ in the latter (data theft, financial loss etc.). With this paradigm, we present an 
environment where there are numerous intervention methods to reduce risk and conversely several exploitations with 
respect to the BYOD trend. It is necessary to discuss each in light of users’ behaviours. 
3.1 A system susceptibility or flaw 
With the introduction of unknown devices into the network the likelihood of a susceptibility or flaw increases. 
Unknown devices are typically self-monitored and (specifically in this case) mobile. This is highly problematic as the 
unknown software, mobile nature and the method in which the device is used presents a real security threat. The phrase, 
‘a system is only as strong as its weakest link’ is highly appropriate when such devices will be configured and managed 
manually with numerous issues associated with this. 
Within many companies employees’ computers are centrally managed under a certain data security policy. These 
machines are static often with a single user per machine and are homogenous throughout the company (with possible 
exceptions in policy related to specific roles within the company – i.e. installation rights, administrator access etc.). This 
allows for a robust, secure (albeit policy dependent) environment where risk can be mitigated by rigid control 
mechanisms. Installation of software can be blocked, operating system, virus scanner, firewalls and software patches 
can be automatically deployed and attachments to peripheral devices can be denied or monitored to name but a few. 
With BYOD, however, the above level of central control is lost. Self-managed devices are typically not used in the 
same manner and often fulfil a multitude of roles. For example, an employee owned laptop will be used in both an 
office environment for work and a home environment for non-work activities. This duality of use, stronger sense of 
ownership, lack of knowledge, lack of prioritization of security by users and lack of central control, may lead to security 
features being omitted or simply not configured correctly, particularly if the security feature is perceived as 
inconvenient or hindering productivity. Activities that would either be impossible or forbidden by policy are now 
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available and this presents a conflict for users related to what they are and are not allowed to do. For instance, a given 
website or software may be forbidden and inaccessible on a work machine. Does this, however, mean that it is 
forbidden on an employees’ own machine outside of work? 
Unsafe practices on a personal device outside of the working environment are problematic when re-introducing a device 
to the work environment. The device has transformed from a personal device back to a work device but has, in the 
process, been exposed to numerous policy breaching activities. It is highly likely that the device has (from a company 
perspective) connected to unknown networks, with unknown traffic, attached to unknown physical devices (a highly 
relevant problem with recent documentation on USB stick firmware exploits – ‘BadUSB’ [31]). This presents a major 
threat to the company’s infrastructure and data security if not carefully managed (e.g.. via separate networks for 
personal devices). 
3.2 Attacker access to the flaw 
Attacks generally fall into three categories: persistent targeted, single targeted or random (chance) [32]. The adoption of 
BYOD is vulnerable to all of these and presents an attractive avenue for attack. One could further argue that BYOD 
introduces an additional ‘physical’ attack relating to device theft that is exacerbated by the mobile nature of the device 
(particularly problematic if the device is not encrypted). 
Targeting such a device can be beneficial to an attacker for many reasons. Firstly, it enables personal targeted attacks 
(i.e. targeting the CEO) which enables attackers to be much more focused. As cyber-attacks are often financially 
motivated (with time being a key factor) identifying such a device optimizes the attack by enabling bespoke methods to 
be devised (either physical or device specific). The attacks are likely to be more successful due to the susceptibilities 
noted in 3.1 and the availability of the device to be attacked (predominantly a more unsecured environment). 
To understand such an attack and how BYOD presents new threat vectors (unless carefully managed) it is necessary to 
work through a practical example. A Man-in-the-Middle [33] attack exploits a network connection by intercepting 
traffic sent and received. The most successful Man-in-the-Middle attacks aim to remain anonymous by having a 
negligible (particularly unquantifiable by humans) impact on users activities. Data is intercepted and subsequently 
analysed in an effort to exploit a particular vulnerability (i.e. stealing Facebook login details via FireSheep FireFox 
plugin [34], [35]). Following the example demonstrated in [8] we see a typical BYOD scenario where attackers can 
exploit users behaviours. When in a public environment where there is a need to access a public Wi-Fi the device is 
placed under threat. Open Wi-Fi networks present an unknown threat environment where it is impossible to verify other 
users and identify malicious activity. This infrastructure provides a relatively simple platform to intercept and steal data 
such as the above Facebook example [34], [35] if connections are not encrypted (typical of small-medium enterprises 
and general public use). Unencrypted connections on such networks are simple to intercept enabling specifically 
targeted attacks to be highly successful. 
Exploiting users’ behaviours is another common approach and is highly prevalent in the form of phishing. This attack 
plays on users’ vulnerabilities and attempts to deceive users into carrying out an action (such as clicking on a link). This 
is a non-technical attack, which targets users, not physical hardware or software. Phishing is a problem since 
permissions are often granted erroneously by users, who are fooled into believing that the task they are presented with is 
genuine. By providing authorization, the attacker can then gain sensitive information (often usernames and passwords) 
allowing them to masquerade as a genuine user. It is then extremely difficult for the system (moreover the system 
administrator) to determine whether or not a user is who they say they are. 
3.3 BYOD risks and controls 
There is clearly significant impact of BYOD on a networks’ security infrastructure if not managed in a controlled 
manner. By enabling users to transport their devices between environments, new vulnerabilities and exploits are 
presented that must be combatted. It is important this control is managed in a fashion that does not detract from the core 
attraction of BYOD, particularly mobility and productivity. 
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4. Assistance in risk assessment under uncertainty 
We now propose an approach to risk assessment assistance in situations of uncertainty. The standard risk assessment 
procedure, for instance suggested in [13] or [14], is adjusted taking into account consumerisation of IT adaptation, e.g. 
proposed in [16], and includes: the estimation of company activities profile; the corporate data and the evaluation of the 
vulnerabilities and threats of professional or personal devices; the security checks of services employees use on a daily 
basis; and the analysis of potential human behaviour vulnerabilities. Moreover, we consider the ownership of devices 
and data (private or corporate) as well as the context, in which the devices, services and data are used. Here, by context, 
we mean a dynamic environment, e.g. work, home or a public place, in which the mobile device users may utilise 
devices or data or services. Note that the context may include services that the employee is allowed to use, e.g., owned 
by company, bought by employee or freeware. 
4.1 Risk assessment for consumerisation of IT 
The designer of a security policy for a company working with mobile devices should consider the properties given in 
Table 1. Together with important functionalities, they may expose security vulnerabilities of devices. Paradoxically, one 
of the greatest advantages of mobile devices, mobility, is also one of its greatest vulnerabilities. Some devices (laptop 
and tablet) have large screens, which makes them convenient for regular tasks (e.g., writing/reading emails, 
programming, watching video), but it also becomes easier to shoulder surf these devices and for data shown on large 
screens to be disclosed accidentally. In Table 1 ‘+’, ‘-’ and ‘?’ refer to the vulnerability of the device type present, 
absent, or not always present in it, respectively. 
Here, we refer to a private device as a mobile device bought by an employee and to a corporate device as a mobile 
device bought by a company for an employee to work on. Then, a mixed-usage device is a private device used not only 
for personal, but also for working purposes or corporate device used for not only working purposes but also personal 
ones. 
Table 2 presents an example of threats adapted from [18] to mixed-usage devices, taking into account vulnerabilities 
presented in Table 1 and considering possible scenarios in which an employee may happen to work. 
 
Table 1. Vulnerabilities of devices 
Property Laptop Tablet Phone USB Stick 
Connectivity + + + + 
Mobility + + + + 
Applications + + + + 
Lock + + + ? 
Remote Access + + + + 
Out of date software/OS + + + + 
Large screen + + - - 
Admin access + ? ? - 
Removable Media ? + + - 
Access to SIM card ? ? + - 
 
On the one hand, many threats presented in Table 2 can be controlled with technical solutions, such as data loss/leakage 
prevention (DLP), if private devices are locked down in a similar way as corporate devices with some security policy 
and/or with mobile device management (MDM) programs that allows management of the assets (both devices and data). 
IJISPM 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management 
8 
Practitioners consider MDM as a necessary risk prevention tool [19], and highlighted the urgent need for an MDM 
version for Android-based devices [20] for companies adopting IT consumerisation. The help of mobile Virtual Private 
Network (VPN), which extend private network across a (various) public networks, was already appreciated by 
companies with ‘mobile’ employees and Research in Motion (RIM) announced a multi-platform version of its 
BlackBerry Enterprise Server [20] for improving security of mobile devices. Separation of private and corporate data 
with data segregation tools may help to differentiate data to be monitored/filtered or not. 
 
Table 2. Threats for devices and corporate data 
Device 
compromised 
Device 
contaminated 
Communication 
compromised 
Data 
compromised 
Data disclosed Security / trust 
model 
weakened 
Device lost Malicious 
application 
installed by user 
Data 
interception in 
transit 
Integrity 
(access via 
security 
breach) 
Inappropriately 
stored / 
transferred 
data 
Personal 
credentials 
shared 
Device stolen Device infected 
by malware / 
virus 
Encryption key 
disclosed 
Confidentiality 
(access via 
security 
breach) 
Discloses data 
after being 
asked (social 
engineering) 
Device 
jailbroken 
Device 
decommissioned 
Device 
contamination 
Insecure 
unencrypted 
connection 
Availability 
(denial of 
service) 
Discloses data 
unintentionally 
(shoulder 
surfing/ 
duplication) 
Security 
controls 
bypassed 
 
 
On the other hand, many threats presented in Table 2 involve risk prone actions, which increase security breaches 
significantly. Hence, companies’ security policies efforts are twofold: the identification of technical controls to apply 
(e.g., which anti-virus to buy, which software to install and how to control its updates, which ways to access corporate 
data are allowed and how to guarantee data protection); and the prevention of possible human errors, with technical 
controls when possible, such as control over anything installed by users and password creation rules, or with education 
sessions, for instance on not sharing personal credential, public Wi-Fi connection and policy jail-breaking. 
Risk is usually considered as the likelihood of an attack multiplied by its impact, where the likelihood of an attack is 
given by the probability that a threat can exploit a particular vulnerability. A typical approach to reduce risk is therefore 
to add some control over the vulnerabilities, so that they are no longer exploitable. However, the usage of mixed-usage 
devices raises the problem of who is responsible to apply some control. Here, control refers to ‘a measure that is 
modifying risk’ [14]. 
Moreover, we differentiate between different levels of control that may maximally reduce risk with full control over 
devices; partially control devices or have no control over devices. Table 3 adapted from [18] shows four possible cases 
of combination of a device owner and a device manager: 1) company provides employees with devices and takes full 
control of these devices, e.g. typical BlackBerry ‘work phone’; 2) company provides devices, but does not manage 
them, e.g. common for universities, having partial control over the devices; 3) employees own devices are controlled by 
companies partially, e.g. iPads and iPhones can be registered to be wiped in case of loss; 4) employees are allowed to 
work with their own devices, but have to take care of security themselves, resulting in company having no control over 
the devices. 
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Table 3. Control of devices depending on ownership manager 
  Device Manager 
  Company Employee 
Device Owner 
Company (1) Full control (2) Partial control 
Employee (3) Partial control (4) No control 
 
The first case (1) is the case of full control: a company both owns and manages the device. Depending on how 
restrictive the security policy is and how well it is complied with, there are still possible threats and corresponding risk 
to the assets of the company, e.g., zero-day vulnerabilities. In case (2) a company provides devices, but does not 
manage them, or in case (3) employees use their own devices, and either company manages them as in case (3) or not as 
in case (4). In cases (2) and (3), a company may apply some security policy to protect the employee’s personal or 
corporate devices with DLP and/or MDM tools. In case (4), there is a danger of uncontrolled threats, as an employee 
might not use some or any protection measures, such as an anti-virus, software updates, passwords, etc. 
5. Nudging for mitigating security risks and improving productivity 
A security policy should be seen as a protective measure, which employees should comply with. In addition to 
punishments for risky behaviour and rewards for secure ones, it should take into account employees’ perspective on 
security rather than simply strengthening the security strategy. A highly restrictive security policy that limits flexibility 
for employees might result in a rebellion effect and push employees towards overriding it. Fundamentally, it would 
expose the company to security risks and corresponding costs related to legal issues that should be taken into account 
when developing a security policy. The problem of non-compliance with security policy even when knowing about 
possible risks was studied earlier, and it was shown that there is some compliance limit for each user (probably, varying 
from user to user) known as the “compliance budget” [21]. Further research [22] focused on understanding non-
compliance and workaround strategies employees apply in order to be more productive and perform their tasks faster. 
Moreover, too restrictive security policies may be less flexible to the dynamic context, in which security decisions are 
made. For instance, a security policy, which allows employees to only connect to Wi-Fi’s in the whitelist of a company. 
However, there may be no available white-listed Wi-Fi’s at the meeting site an employee is attending. Hence, the 
employees would be unable to work if the policy is enforced on their device, or they may choose to breach policy and 
connect to a publicly available Wi-Fi. Often at the moment of making security decisions there is no objective 
information for evaluating consequences of each possible choice, and often such decisions are made in situations of 
uncertainty. For instance, when connecting to a non-secure public Wi-Fi the decision makers might not realize the risks 
and consequences of possible security breaches. However, the choices are still made (e.g. one of the Wi-Fi’s should be 
selected for work) and the decision maker must take responsibility for (even unrecognised) consequences of such 
decisions. 
The traditional approach for helping employees to make better security decisions is via education and training sessions 
on the security policy of the company [16], [18]. It is an efficient, but a time-consuming approach that requires 
conscious reflection of employees on security issues and possible consequences of such decisions for them and their 
company. However, awareness and knowledge does not necessarily lead to the required behaviour. Contrary to 
education on security risks, nudging is an explicit recommendation or more subtle influence emphasizing some choice, 
but not forcing it. It has a reputation of making a big difference by small changes and still leaving the freedom of choice 
to the decision maker, who might require it when working on his/her own device. It is also important when security 
decisions are made in situations of uncertainty, where an employee might be better informed than the company, 
possessing more information on the context of the decision. 
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5.1 Nudging for security and productivity: What is it? 
In this work, we investigate a possibility of applying a recently proposed ‘nudging’ approach [23] to influence 
information security choices as a ‘soft’ alternative to more restrictive security policy. Nudging provides a framework, 
called choice architecture, which presents available alternatives in such a way that influences the decision makers’ final 
choice [23]. This approach is referred to as libertarian paternalist, in the health and social behaviour domains ‘people 
are free to do what they choose, but that it is legitimate to influence people’s behaviour in the positive direction’ [24]. 
This approach has been adopted by the governments (e.g. UK and USA) to encourage behaviours promoted by 
government policies but still be seen to provide freedom of choice.  
Nudging has been widely used in healthcare [3] and social policies [4] to change behaviour of people with minimal 
interventions. In these initiatives the nudged behaviour is widely accepted as the best according to both governments 
and population, such as fighting obesity and paying tax, respectively. The research results on applied cases of nudging 
are very encouraging and show that, indeed, the manner, in which the information is presented to the decision maker, 
influences the choice. For instance, it was shown that rearranging menu items in student's cafeteria may 
increase/decrease consumption of a particular item by up to 25%, since the first options in the list have higher chances 
of being selected [23].  
Similarly, the nudging can be adapted to influence people’s choices in information security. The solutions towards 
which nudging will be done should be based on rigorous models developed using quantitative risk assessment 
techniques. They should take into account the trade-offs between productivity benefits and security risks for each 
particular scenario, and nudge the decision maker towards the best compromise trade-off solutions, but also taking into 
account context of the decision-making, security policy of the company and preferences of the particular decision maker 
when possible. Assuming that uncertainty is present in such security scenarios, the outcome of the rigorously assessed 
models will be used to frame choice architecture for decision makers in such a way that it nudges decision-makers to 
make better information security and productivity decisions, but still leaves the final choice for the decision maker. 
Nudging towards more secure and/or more productive solution(s) may be seen as improving security for society or 
advice from an employer to an unaware employee. Nudged users may either follow the nudge or ignore it, if the choice 
does not look appealing. Such an approach leaves the final choice with employees; this assumes that they understand 
what is better for them in the context of the decision-making.  
5.2 Nudging for security and productivity: How to influence? 
Six techniques are presented in [23] to support the creation of nudges: incentives, understanding mapping, defaults, give 
feedback, expect error and structure complex choices. They can be used to build a choice architecture that aims to 
influence choice made by the decision maker.  
To develop incentives for information security, we need to understand the rewards that would encourage employees to 
make the choices we want, and the punishments that would stop them from making choices we do not want. For 
instance, would warning messages when connected to fast unsecure Wi-Fi encourage employees to switch to slower but 
more secure Wi-Fi that does not present such warnings? 
For understanding mapping between available options and consequences that follow, we need to be aware of the risks 
employee’s take and the convenience employee’s gain. For instance, studies looking at choosing between more secure 
Wi-Fi not protected by password and less secure Wi-Fi protected by password shows that people perceive more secure 
solutions as being more complex by default, and less secure solutions being easier and faster to implement [25].  
Default choices have shown to be selected by people who “go with the flow” and do not pay much attention to them. 
Default choices for security-related decisions should be pre-selected to the most secure, leaving the freedom for users to 
uncheck selections or change defaults if desired. 
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Giving feedback on choices, whether they were positive or negative, helps users to learn from their past decisions and 
use this experience in future. Knowing that users make errors and expecting errors means being more creative in 
providing available choices in a simple and understandable manner, as well as guiding choices with explanations and 
help options. The last point is also important, the presentation and structuring of complex choices should reduce 
people’s cognitive load, e.g., sectioning decision so that there are clear steps and a limited number of options to choose 
from at any point in time [26]. 
In addition to the six techniques provided by choice architecture, organisational psychology and behavioural economics 
have identified many different factors that influence behaviour. The MINDSPACE framework [27] summaries these 
influencing techniques some of which are common to those presented in [23]: messenger, incentives, norms, default, 
salience, priming, affect, commitment and ego. Messenger indicates the owner of the recommendation, e.g., boss of the 
company and norms appeal to choices other people in society or company are doing. Salience emphasizes how the 
choice is important to us. Priming addresses framing effects, which is related to our subconscious, and affect appeals to 
our emotional component. Commitment refers to our promises made and ego appeals to acting in a way that makes us 
feeling good about ourselves. Similarly to nudges, influencing factors can be used for constructing choice architectures 
in security. In addition, [28] outlines a process by which companies can explore the creation of nudges to solve specific 
security problems within their companies by using MINDSPACE as part of creative workshops with staff to identify 
factors influencing their security behaviours. 
5.3 Nudging for security and productivity: When is it appropriate? 
The company may decide on when to apply nudging depending on the level of control the company has over the device. 
Recalling Table 3 with four various cases of device ownership and management, resulting in three levels of control: 
full, partial and no control. Taking into account possible context in which the security related decisions are made, here, 
we argue on appropriateness and benefit of nudging, see Table 4. Similarly to Table 3, we consider the owner and 
manager of the device (company or employee) and context (working or not, e.g. public places, home, private houses, 
other companies). In Table 4 in ‘Nudging’ column ‘+’ and ‘-’ indicate cases, where nudging is desirable and beneficial 
and not, respectively. 
 
Table 4. Devices control and nudging 
# Device Owner Device Manager Context Control Nudging 
(1) Company Company Working Full - 
(2) Company Company Public/Private Partial + 
(3) Company Employee Working Partial + 
(4) Company Employee Public/Private Partial + 
(5) Employee Company Working Partial + 
(6) Employee Company Public/Private Partial + 
(7) Employee Employee Working Partial + 
(8) Employee Employee Public/Private No - 
 
Note that in the context we can also include services that the employee is allowed to use. For instance, in case publicly 
available services are used by employees at work on working devices, such as Dropbox or social networks, the scenario 
should no longer be classified as the first case of full control. 
Indeed, with the exception of case (1) of full control, where a company controls and manages working devices in 
working context, and case (8) of no control, where there is no any control over an employee’s owned and managed 
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device used in non-working context, presented in Table 4, nudging is appropriate and beneficial in the rest of the cases 
of partial control over a device.  
For instance, an Information Security policy may state that users should not access social networks from a work device. 
A company may restrict access to such a websites and prevent access in case (1). However, that would not be possible 
in case (3), where an employee is managing corporate device, or in case (6), where an employee works on a personal 
device providing some managing privileges to the company, and such a restriction would disturb employee’s ownership 
feelings. On the contrary, nudging employees away from social networks websites during working hours would be seen 
as advice from the company that an employee can override when justified, e.g., for working purposes in order to 
advertise some company products or jobs in social networks. 
5.4 Nudging for security and productivity: Examples of tested scenarios 
Nudging has been explored in information security, for instance, for nudging users away from privacy invasive choices 
[5]-[8] by using colour to positively and negatively frame information. Traditionally, red is associated with danger, e.g. 
red in traffic light or the infamous ‘red button’, and green with safety or ‘to go’ in a traffic light signal. Traffic light 
colour schemes are widely applied in cyber security design, e.g., for indicating what can be done with shared 
information in a traffic light protocol [29] or for framing choice options [5]. 
One of the possible applications of nudging in the security context was presented in [8], [11], where a traffic light 
colour scheme is used for a choice of public Wi-Fi. In this works an example of nudging a user towards selecting a 
more secure Wi-Fi is considered. Choice architecture is organized so that available Wi-Fi’s are ordered in such a way 
that the most secure networks are placed at the top of the list and their names are coloured ‘green’, while names of less 
secure Wi-Fi’s are  ‘yellow’ and open Wi-Fi’s are ‘red’. The results show that the colour was effective in influencing 
the choice of users, when compared to the order, which did not change the choice significantly. However, in 
preliminary evaluations the combination of order and colour successfully nudged more people away from insecure 
networks than one factor alone. 
5.5 Nudging for security and productivity: Examples of potential scenarios 
As potential scenarios where nudging can be applied efficiently, the following scenarios are considered: choosing a new 
password (enforced by company), determining whether to accept or decline a mobile application’s permissions. In these 
scenarios decision makers are facing a trading-off task of choosing between being more productive or more secure. For 
instance, creating a new password, which is similar to the old one, is fast and takes less time and effort to remember, 
however, this strategy leads to creating weak passwords according to security metrics [36]. Similarly, accepting all 
permissions that an application requires when being installed on a mobile phone is fast and easy, however, it might 
compromise the user. 
Password renewal is a common procedure required by companies to better protect devices and data of their employees 
and users of software or provided services from potential malicious attackers. Several academic papers have highlighted 
both the need for secure passwords and how to create them [37] (‘strength’ meters are now commonplace). Equally 
important, however, is the frequency and rules that govern this process (how often passwords are updated and their 
complexity). It is essential to strike a balance between maintaining security and inconveniencing users, since password 
renewals increase the chance of forgetting them, but also the users willingness to comply decreases [38]. Forcing users 
to create too strong passwords may lead either to difficulties of memorizing passwords and creating security breaches 
by writing passwords down and disposing them to potentially malicious attackers or forgetting them. Alternatively, 
nudging may help with creating a more secure, memorable password. 
At its core, a nudge should be holistic and not annoying. This is essential for password creation, as we do not want to 
over-burden users with additional time restraints or cognitive load. At the same time users should be able to override a 
nudge due to strong preferences towards an option different from the one suggested by a nudge. The nudge for 
password creation must be present at the point where the password is being decided, for instance, some intervention 
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after suggesting to create a new or to update an old password and before the cognitive process is started. The point of 
password entry is too late. The experiment described in [39] has demonstrated the direct impact of forcing users to wait 
a fixed time period in order to improve their password strength. Perhaps a social nudge would also be beneficial here. 
Social nudges work by playing on social norms. For instance, users can be informed at the point of suggesting a new 
password creation or an old password update that high percentage of people in their company update their passwords 
regularly with strong alternatives, e.g. a popup is presented ‘74% of employees choose a stronger password’. 
Application permissions have increased temporally as a factor of operating system upgrades, new technology, and 
greater socio-technical connectivity. New communication technologies such as Near Field Communication (NFC), 
Bluetooth LE (Low Energy) provide new methods which allows to share data stored on given devices. These new 
technologies, however, are utilized by applications (e.g. NFC typically used for card payment methods and Bluetooth 
LE by sport fitness accessories) but must first call operating system methods that are governed explicitly by 
permissions. On installation of an application, these permissions are presented to users in order to detail what the 
application has access to and some indication of why it is necessary. Unfortunately, current implementations of this 
process are poor and end users have little information on which to base their decisions. An application may request 
(perhaps legitimate) access to the address book, but without direct statements regarding why it is unclear whether or not 
these should be accepted. Recently, Facebook [40] received negative press coverage for their applications due to the 
way in which the permissions were presented and worded when in fact the core functionality of the applications 
remained the same. It was the permission text that had changed thus generating negative connotations of privacy 
invasion to users. Here adding more information on usage of the requested data by the application would help in 
nudging users towards positive responses. 
By extending the permission text to include possible implications of accepting the permission, the user would be more 
informed as to whether or not they wished to accept and thus install the application. This would potentially prevent 
significant data leakage and personally identifiable information via uploading of contacts or media on the device for 
example. Similarly to the previously discussed Wi-Fi study [8], ordering and colouring could be adopted to highlight 
the most significant threats to security. As demonstrated in the previous study, ordering and colouring had a significant 
positive effect on the security of the chosen Wi-Fi network. To demonstrate, access to the address book or media could 
be highlighted red and given prominence by ordering it at the top of the list (with additional related text to highlight the 
potential impact of sharing this). Typically less security invasive permissions would conversely be ordered towards the 
bottom and highlighted green (permission to change the ringtone for instance). The combination of these visual nudges 
enforced with priming would allow users to make a more informed decisions as to whether the application was indeed 
trustworthy (why does a solitaire game require my location?) or whether it was suspicious. 
Both of the above examples of potential nudges provide an interesting test bed for future investigation and highlight the 
complex nature in which security decisions are made. Encouraging users for more secure decisions should not prevent 
them from being productive when needed and nudging appears to be an easy form for such soft influence, which can be 
applied together with other complementary ways of influencing users by educating and training them on a regular basis.  
6. Conclusions 
In this work, we have discussed the recent trend of both large companies and SMEs towards adopting the 
consumerisation of IT. In addition to the commonly recognized risks and opportunities that this trend carries for the 
companies and their employees, we highlighted the uncertainty that consumerisation introduces. This uncertainty is due 
to the changed ownership model and context or the potentially unsecure environments, in which an employee is using 
private or company owned devices and corporate data. To help mitigate against potential risks, we have suggested the 
adoption of a ‘soft’ strategy of nudging that tries to influence the choices of employees by subtly pushing them towards 
more appropriate decisions, leaving the final choice and the responsibility for its consequences to employees. This 
approach can be used to complement the company’s compliance policy. In addition, such an approach takes into 
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account the ownership model and considers the dynamics of the context, in which employees might be in a better 
position to make a decision. 
When compared to a more restrictive and less flexible compliance policies, which leave no choice to decision makers, 
an alternative ‘soft’ nudging approach looks appealing when freedom of choice is at stake. This approach pushes users 
towards more responsibility, when dealing with corporate data/device, which may also be advantageous, considering 
awakening awareness of employees with regards to security risks. 
We considered several tested and potential examples of nudging in security context and showed how users can be softly 
influenced towards choosing some of the options that are considered to be better from security and or productivity 
points of view. At the same time nudging assumes that decision makers ‘know better’ and are free to override nudges. 
As future work, we are considering development of rigorous risk assessment of trade-off solutions for concrete security 
scenarios to ground solutions towards which nudging is performed. It is a complex task of trading security and 
productivity objectives of a decision maker, while taking into account security policy of the company and the 
employee’s personal preferences. We also aim at proposing methodology to construct choice architectures in security, 
and to be able to evaluate the impact in corporate risk through nudging techniques. 
Acknowledgments 
The authors acknowledge funding for “Choice Architecture for Information Security” (ChAISe) project EP/K006568/1 
from Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), UK, and Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), UK, as a part of Cyber Research Institute. We would gratefully acknowledge the support and 
contribution of our colleagues on the ChAISe project from Northumbria University: Debora Jeske and Pam Briggs, who 
worked with us to identify issues and solutions in this project. 
References 
[1] Consumerisation: The Power of Many. Economist, Special Report: Personal Technology, 2011, Available online: 
[http://www.economist.com/node/21530921]. 
[2] Trend Micro Inc. Trend Micro Helps IT Embrace Consumerization; Computer Security Update 12(8) 2011.  
Available online: [www.wvpubs.com]. 
[3] A.S. Hanks, D.R. Just, B. Wansink. “Trigger foods: The influence of irrelevant alternatives in school lunchrooms”. 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 41(1); 2012, p.114-123. 
[4] Applying behavioural insights to reduce fraud, error and debt, Behavioral Insight Team. Cabinet Office report, UK 
2012. Available online: 
[https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60539/BIT_FraudErrorDebt_accessible.
pdf]. 
[5] E.K. Chloe, J. Jung, B. Lee, and K. Fisher “Nudging people away from privacy invasive mobile apps through visual 
framing”. In INTERACT, LNCS, Springer. 8119 (3); 2013, p. 74-91. 
[6] Y. Wang, P.G. Leon, K. Scott, X. Chen, A. Acquisti, L.F. Cranor “Privacy nudges for social media: an exploratory 
Facebook study”. In Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web companion (WWW '13 
Companion). International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, Republic and Canton of Geneva, 
Switzerland, 2013; p. 763-770. 
[7] A. Acquisti “Nudging Privacy: The Behavioral Economics of Personal Information”, IEEE Security & Privacy, 
7(6); 2009 p. 82-85. 
IJISPM 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management 
15 
[8] J. Turland, L. Coventry, D. Jeske, P. Briggs, C. Laing, I. Yevseyeva, A. van Moorsel “Nudging towards security: 
Developing an application for wireless network selection for android phones”. (in preparation) 
[9] C. Morisset, T. Gross, A. van Moorsel, I. Yevseyeva “Nudging for quantitative access control systems”. In Human 
Aspects of Information Security, Privacy and Trust, LNCS, Springer, Volume 8533, 2014, p 340-351. 
[10] C. Morisset, I. Yevseyeva, T. Gross, A. van Moorsel “A Formal Model for Soft Enforcement: Influencing the 
Decision-Maker”. Security and Trust Management, LNCS, Springer, Volume 8743, 2014, p. 113-128. 
[11] D. Jeske, L. Coventry, P.Briggs, & A. van Moorsel. (2014). “Nudging whom how:  IT proficiency, impulse control 
and secure behaviour”. CHI Workshop on Personalizing Behavior Change Technologies, CHI 2014. Available online: 
Available online: [http://personalizedchange.weebly.com/1/post/2014/03/nudging-whom-how-it-proficiency-impulse-
control-and-secure-behavior.html] 
[12] I. Yevseyeva, C. Morisset, T. Gross, A. van Moorsel “A Decision Making Model of Influencing Behavior in 
Information Security”. Computer Performance Engineering, LNCS, Springer. Volume 8721, 2014, p. 194-208. 
[13] Tech Dep of ENISA Section Risk Management and Patsis G (Obrela Security Industries). Information Package for 
SMEs with risk assessment / risk management for two SMEs. ENISA report 2007. Available online: 
[https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/files/deliverables/information-packages-for-small-and-
medium-sized-enterprises-smes]. 
[14] BS ISO/IEC 27005:2011 British standard for Information technology – Security techniques – Information security 
risk management. BSI standards Publication. 2011. 
[15] J. Clarcke, M.G. Hidalgo, A. Lioy, M. Petkovic, C. Vishik, J. Ward. Consumerization of IT: Top risks and 
opportunities. Responding to the evolving threat environment. ENISA report 2012. Available online: 
[http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/evolving-threat-environment/consumerization-of-it-top-risks-
and-opportunities]. 
[16] J. Clarcke, M.G. Hidalgo, A. Lioy, M. Petkovic, C. Vishik, J. Ward, L. Marinos. Consumerization of IT: Risk 
mitigation strategies. Responding to the evolving threat environment. ENISA report 2012. Available online: 
[http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/risk-management/evolving-threat-
environment/COITMitigationStategiesPublishedVersion.pdf]. 
[17] H.H. Thompson. Consumerization and security: Effective Security Practice Series. Microsoft Corp. White paper. 
2010. Available online: [download.microsoft.com/download/E/F/9/EF9F24B7-DB49-44D4-8F6A-
A49D5020B8B8/Consumerization_Final.pdf]. 
[18] MWR Infosecurity and CPNI. Mobile Devices Guide for Implementers. 2013. 
[19] J. Hunt, “BYOD Policy – What Businesses Need to Consider”, Credit Control, 2012; 33(5/6), p. 69. 
[20] M. Savage, IT consumerization drives new security thinking. Information Security Magazine, 27 May 2011 
Available online: [SearchSecurity.com].  
[21] A. Beautement, M.A. Sasse, M. Wonham. “The compliance budget: managing security behaviour in 
organisations”. In Proceedings of the 2008 workshop on New security paradigms (NSPW '08). ACM, New York, NY, 
USA, 2008; p. 47-58.  
[22] I. Kirlappos, S. Parkin, M.A. Sasse. “Learning from “Shadow Security”: Why understanding non-compliance 
provides the basis for effective security”. In Proceedings of Workshop on Usable Security, 2014. 
[23] R.H. Thaler, C.R. Sunstein. “Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness”. New Haven, 
CT, USA: Yale University Press; 2008. 
IJISPM 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management 
16 
[24] A. Fletcher, T. Marteau, T. Worsley. “Helpdesk report: Use of behavioural economics in development 
interventions”, 2012. Human Development Resource Centre. Available online: [http://www.heart-resources.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Use-of-Behavioural-Economics-February-2012.pdf] 
[25] B.C. Kim, Y.W. Park, “Security versus convenience? An experimental study of user misperceptions of wireless 
Internet service quality”, Decision Support Systems, 53 (1); 2012, p. 1-11.  
[26] G.A. Miller, “The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing 
information”. Psychological Review 63(2);1956, p. 81–97. 
[27] P. Dolan, M. Hallsworth, D. Halpern, D. King, & R. Metcalfe “Influencing Behaviour: The MINDSPACE way”. 
Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, (2012) 264-277. 
[28] L. Coventry, P. Briggs, D. Jeske, D, & A. van Moorsel. “SCENE: A Structured Means for Creating and Evaluating 
Behavioral Nudges in a Cybersecurity Environment”.  In Design, User Experience, and Usability. Theories, Methods, 
and Tools for Designing the User Experience. LNCS Springer, Volume 8517, 2014, p. 229-239. 
[29] G. Farnham, K. Leune. “Tools and standards for cyber threat intelligence projects”, 2013. 
[30] U.S. Air Force Software Protection Initiative. ‘The Three Tenents of Cyber Security’. Retrieved 2009-12-15. 
Available online: [http://www.spi.dod.mil/tenets.htm]. 
[31] “BadUSB” exploit makes devices turn “evil”. ARS Technica. Available online: 
http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/07/this-thumbdrive-hacks-computers-badusb-exploit-makes-devices-turn-evil/ 
[32] Cyber Attacks Statistics. Hackmageddon. Avaialble online: http://hackmageddon.com/category/security/cyber-
attacks-statistics/ 
[33] Man in the middle attacks demo. Blackhat. Available online: https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-
03/bh-us-03-ornaghi-valleri.pdf 
[34] The Facebook Setting You Should Change as Quickly as Possible. Gawker. 2011. Available online: 
http://gawker.com/5744229/the-facebook-setting-you-should-change-as-quickly-as-possible 
[35] A Continued Commitment to Security. Facebook. 2011. Available online: 
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/a-continued-commitment-to-security/486790652130 
[36] B. Ur, P. G. Kelley, S. Komanduri, J. Lee, M. Maass, M. L. Mazurek, T. Passaro, R. Shay, T. Vidas, L. Bauer, N. 
Christin, and L. F. Cranor. “Guess Again (and Again and Again): Measuring Password Strength by Simulating 
Password-Cracking Algorithms”. In Proceedings of the 2012 Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). 
ACM, 2012. 
[37] M. Weir et al. “Testing metrics for password creation policies by attacking large sets of revealed passwords”. 
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, 2010. 
[38] R. Shay, et al. “Encountering Stronger Password Requirements: User Attitudes and Behaviors”. Proceedings of the 
Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). ACM, 2010. 
[39] N. Malkin, S. Krishnamurthi, D.H. Laidlaw, “Poster: Waiting makes the Heart Grow Fonder and the Password 
Grow Stronger”. Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). 2013. 
[40] The Insidiousness of Facebook Messenger's Android Mobile App Permissions (Updated). Huffington Post. 2014. 
Available online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-fiorella/the-insidiousness-of-face_b_4365645.html 
IJISPM 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management 
17 
Biographical notes 
 
 
Iryna Yevseyeva 
Iryna Yevseyeva is a research associate at the Choice Architecture for Information Security 
(ChAISe) project at Newcastle University. She contributes to the project with her expertise in 
optimisation and decision making, in particular, in multi-criteria optimisation and decision analysis. 
Before joining Newcastle University in 2013, she was a post-doctoral researcher on multi-objective 
optimisation: in the Netherlands the Leiden Institute of Advanced Computer Science at the Leiden 
University in 2012-2013 on drug discovery; and in Portugal at the Polytechnic Institute of Leiria in 
2011-2012 on spam filtering; at INESC Porto with Ciencia 2008 grant in 2009-2011 on scheduling; 
at the University of Algarve with grants from Academy of Finland and European Commission 
(Erasmus Mundus) in 2008-2009 on algorithms development. Iryna received PhD degree in 
computer science and optimisation from the University of Jyvaskyla, Finland, in 2007, for the 
research on multicriteria classification with applications in healthcare. Before joining PhD program 
in 2004, she worked as a software developer at the Niilo Maki Institute of Neuropsychology, Finland, 
in 2001-2003. She has Master of Science degree in mobile computing from the University of 
Jyvaskyla, Finland (2001) and Master degree with honours in information technology from the 
Kharkov National University of Radio-electronics, Ukraine (2000). 
 
 
 
James Turland 
I am currently finishing my PhD in consumerisation and security modelling. I have worked on the 
Choice Architecture for Information Security (ChAISe) project for the past 18 months as a Research 
Associate at Newcastle University. I have a keen interest in security, specifically in understanding 
the role of the user and how technology can be adapted to build a more secure environment. Outside 
of my academic work I am an avid cyclist. 
 
 
 
 
Charles Morisset 
Charles Morisset is a Senior Research Associate at Newcastle University, working with Aad van 
Moorsel on quantitative aspects of security, in particular in the decision making process and in 
access control mechanisms. Charles received is PhD from Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 
VI in France in 2007, on the topic of formalisation of access control systems. He then worked from 
2007 to 2009 at the United Nations University, in Macau SAR, China, on formal methods for 
software engineering, after which he joined the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, 
University of London, to work on risk-based access control until 2011. From 2011 to 2013, he 
worked at the Istituto di Informatica e Telematica in Pisa, Italy, on formal methods and access 
control, and he joined the Centre for Cybercrime and Computer Security at Newcastle University in 
2013. 
 
 
IJISPM 
 
 
 
 
 
International Journal of Information Systems and Project Management 
18 
 
Lynne Coventry 
Lynne Coventry is the Director of PaCT Lab (Psychology and Communication Technology) at the 
University of Northumbria. She is an applied researcher who enjoys working in multidisciplinary 
teams to solve real problems. She is keen to explore new ways of integrating psychology into 
design and technology development processes. While her early career was spent as a research 
fellow and lecturer at Stirling University, Heriot Watt and Dundee university, the majority of her 
career has been as a researcher within Industry (both computing and medical products) working to 
incorporate understanding of people, their use and acceptance of technology into the requirements 
and design process. Lynne is best known for her work on usable security, particularly 
authentication.  
 
 
 
Thomas Groß 
Thomas Groß is a tenured lecturer (assistant professor) in security, privacy and trust at the School 
of Computing Science at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne (since 2011). He is the director of 
the Centre for Cybercrime and Computer Security (CCCS), a UK Academic Centre of Excellence 
in Cyber Security Research (ACE-CSR). His research interests are in security and privacy as well 
as applied cryptography and formal methods. He was a tenured research scientist in the Security 
and Cryptography group of IBM Research - Zurich before that and IBM's Research Relationship 
Manager for privacy research. Thomas received his M.Sc. (Dipl. Inf.) in Computer Science at the 
Saarland University, Germany, in 2004. He received his Ph.D. (Dr.-Ing.) from the Ruhr-University 
Bochum, Germany, in 2009. His thesis was on the security analysis of standardized identity 
federation. Thomas is a member of the GI, ACM, IEEE, IACR and EATA, as well as Alumnus of 
the German National Academic Foundation. 
  
 
Christopher Laing 
Dr Christopher Laing is a University Fellow in the Faculty of Engineering and Environment, and 
the Project Director of Northumbria University’s Warning, Advice & Reporting Point. He is co-
editor of ‘Securing Critical Infrastructures and Industrial Control Systems’, and a consultant for the 
European Network & Information Security Agency (ENISA). He has authored ENISA reports on 
Cyber-Bullying and Online Grooming and the Identification of Emerging and Future Risks, and he 
has worked with national law enforcement agencies in the development of postgraduate computer 
forensics/digital security programmes. He is currently Co-Investigator on EP/K006568/1: ‘Choice 
Architecture for Information Security’, part of the GCHQ/EPSRC Cyber Security Research 
Institute. 
 
 
Aad van Moorsel 
Aad van Moorsel is a Professor in Distributed Systems and Head of School at the School of 
Computing Science in Newcastle University. His group conducts research in security, privacy and 
trust. Almost all of the group's research contains elements of quantification, be it through system 
measurement, predictive modelling or on-line adaptation. Aad worked in industry from 1996 until 
2003, first as a researcher at Bell Labs/Lucent Technologies in Murray Hill and then as a research 
manager at Hewlett-Packard Labs in Palo Alto, both in the United States. He got his PhD in 
computer science from Universiteit Twente in The Netherlands (1993) and has a Masters in 
mathematics from Universiteit Leiden, also in The Netherlands. After finishing his PhD he was a 
postdoc at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA, for two years. Aad 
became the Head of the School of Computing Science in 2012. 
 
 
